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THE UNIVERSAL FINITE SET
JOEL DAVID HAMKINS AND W. HUGH WOODIN
Abstract. We define a certain finite set in set theory {x | ϕ(x) } and prove
that it exhibits a universal extension property: it can be any desired particular
finite set in the right set-theoretic universe and it can become successively
any desired larger finite set in top-extensions of that universe. Specifically,
ZFC proves the set is finite; the definition ϕ has complexity Σ2, so that any
affirmative instance of it ϕ(x) is verified in any sufficiently large rank-initial
segment of the universe Vθ ; the set is empty in any transitive model and others;
and if ϕ defines the set y in some countable model M of ZFC and y ⊆ z for
some finite set z in M , then there is a top-extension of M to a model N in
which ϕ defines the new set z. Thus, the set shows that no model of set
theory can realize a maximal Σ2 theory with its natural number parameters,
although this is possible without parameters. Using the universal finite set,
we prove that the validities of top-extensional set-theoretic potentialism, the
modal principles valid in the Kripke model of all countable models of set
theory, each accessing its top-extensions, are precisely the assertions of S4.
Furthermore, if ZFC is consistent, then there are models of ZFC realizing the
top-extensional maximality principle.
1. Introduction
The second author [Woo11] established the universal algorithm phenomenon,
showing that there is a Turing machine program with a certain universal top-
extension property in models of arithmetic. Namely, the program provably enu-
merates a finite set of natural numbers, but it is relatively consistent with PA that
it enumerates any particular desired finite set of numbers, and furthermore, if M is
any model of PA in which the program enumerates the set s and t is any (possibly
nonstandard) finite set in M with s ⊆ t, then there is a top-extension of M to a
model N in which the program enumerates exactly the new set t. So it is a universal
finite computably enumerable set, which can in principle be any desired finite set
of natural numbers in the right arithmetic universe and become any desired larger
finite set in a suitable larger arithmetic universe.1
The first author [Ham17] inquired whether there is a set-theoretic analogue of
this phenomenon, using Σ2 definitions in set theory in place of computable enu-
merability. The idea was that just as a computably enumerable set is one whose
elements are gradually revealed as the computation proceeds, a Σ2-definable set in
set theory is precisely one whose elements become verified at some level Vθ of the
Commentary can be made about this article on the first author’s blog at
http://jdh.hamkins.org/the-universal-finite-set.
1Woodin’s theorem appears in [Woo11]; Blanck and Enayat [BE17; Bla17] removed the re-
striction to countable models and extended the result to weaker theories; Hamkins provided a
simplified proof in [Ham18]; Shavrukov had reportedly circulated a similar argument privately,
pointing out that it can be seen as an instance of the Berarducci [Ber90] construction.
1
2 JOEL DAVID HAMKINS AND W. HUGH WOODIN
cumulative set-theoretic hierarchy as it grows. In this sense, Σ2 definability in set
theory is analogous to computable enumerability in arithmetic.
Main Question (Hamkins). Is there a universal Σ2 definition in set theory, one
which can define any desired particular set in some model of ZFC and always any
desired further set in a suitable top-extension?
The first author had noticed in [Ham17] that one can do this using a Π3 defi-
nition, or with a Σ2 definition, if one restricts to models of a certain theory, such
as V 6= HOD or the eventual GCH, or if one allows { x | ϕ(x) } sometimes to be a
proper class.
Here, we provide a fully general affirmative answer with the following theorem.
Main Theorem. There is a formula ϕ(x) of complexity Σ2 in the language of set
theory, provided in the proof, with the following properties:
(1) ZFC proves that { x | ϕ(x) } is a finite set.
(2) In any transitive model of ZFC and others, this set is empty.
(3) If M is a countable model of ZFC in which ϕ defines the set y and z ∈M
is any finite set in M with y ⊆ z, then there is a top-extension of M to a
model N in which ϕ defines exactly z.
Notice that the main theorem provides a universal finite set, rather than a uni-
versal set as in the main question, but we should like to emphasize that this ac-
tually makes for a stronger result, since the union of the universal finite set will
be a universal set—the union of an arbitrary finite set, after all, is an arbitrary
set. Similarly, by taking the union of just the countable members of the universal
finite set, one achieves a universal countable set, and other kinds of universal sets
are achieved in the same way for other cardinalities or requirements. The proof
will show that one can equivalently formulate the main theorem in terms of finite
sequences, rather than finite sets, so that the sequence is extended arbitrarily as
desired in the top-extension. The sets y and z in statement (3) may be nonstandard
finite, if M is ω-nonstandard.
In the final section, we shall apply our analysis to the theory of top-extensional
set-theoretic potentialism. In particular, we shall show that the top-extensional
potentialist validities of the countable models of set theory, for assertions with
parameters, are precisely the modal assertions of S4. We shall also provide models
of the top-extensional maximality principle, models M of ZFC, for which whenever
a sentence σ is true in some top-extension ofM and all further top-extensions, then
it is already true in M and all its top-extensions.
2. Background
Let us briefly review some background classical results and constructions, which
we shall make use of in the proof of the main theorem.
2.1. Top-extensions. A top-extension of a model of set theory
〈
M,∈M
〉
, also
known as a rank-extension, is another model
〈
N,∈N
〉
where M is a submodel of N
and all the new sets in N have rank above any ordinal of M . So every VMα is the
same as V Nα , for ordinals α ∈ Ord
M . This is a topped -extension, if there is a least
new ordinal in N \M .
One can similarly define a notion of top-extension for models of arithmetic, where
the former model is an initial segment of the latter model, and in fact every model of
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PA, whether countable or uncountable, has a nontrivial elementary top-extension.
This theorem goes back in spirit perhaps to the 1934 definable ultrapower con-
struction of Skolem [Sko34] (reprinted in [Sko70]), providing a top-extension of the
standard model of arithmetic. Many years later, Mac Dowell and Specker [MDS61]
proved the general case, handling arbitrary models of PA, including uncountable
models. Keisler and Morley [KM68] extended the analysis to models of set the-
ory, showing that every model of ZF of countable cofinality (in particular, every
countable model) has arbitrarily large elementary top-extensions.
Theorem 1 (Keisler, Morley). Every countable model of ZFC has an elementary
top-extension.
Proof sketch. The theorem can be proved with the definable ultrapower method.
After first forcing to add a global well-order, without adding sets, one then enu-
merates all the definable classes of ordinals in the model and all definable functions
f : Ord→M , allowing the global well-order to appear in the definitions. In a con-
struction with ω-many steps, one constructs an M -ultrafilter U on OrdM , which
decides every definable class of ordinals in M , concentrates on final segments of
OrdM , and has the property that every definable function f : OrdM → M that
is bounded on a set in U is constant on a set in U . One can simply build the
ultrafilter step-by-step, using the pigeon-hole principle to make the bounded func-
tions constant. Global choice is used to establish the  Los´ theorem for the definable
ultrapower, which then provides the desired elementary top-extension. 
Keisler and Silver [KS71] showed that the result is not true in general for un-
countable models, for 〈Vκ,∈〉 has no elementary top-extension when κ is the least
inaccessible cardinal (and the weakly compact cardinals are characterized by simi-
lar extension properties, with predicates). Enayat [Ena84, theorem 1.5(b)] showed
that indeed every consistent extension T of ZFC has a model of size ℵ1 with no
top-extension to a model of ZFC (verified also for ZF in unpublished work). That
the rather classless models have no top-extensions is due to Kaufman and Enayat
(Kaufman showed it for κ-like models, where κ is regular; Enayat [Ena84] proved
the general case, with a different proof). Because uncountable models of set theory
need not necessarily have top-extensions, one cannot expect a version of the main
theorem for arbitrary uncountable models, even though the universal algorithm
result holds for arbitrary models of arithmetic, including uncountable models.
In the countable case of theorem 1, one cannot in general find a topped-extension,
because the pointwise definable (see [HLR13]) and more generally the Paris models
can have no topped-extension, for such an extension would recognize the previous
model as pointwise definable or a Paris model and therefore realize that it has only
countably many countable ordinals (see [Ena05, theorem 3.11]). For this reason,
one cannot expect in the proof above to construct a normal ultrafilter, since the
resulting definable ultrapower would be topped.
2.2. Locally verifiable properties are the Σ2 properties. The principal mo-
tivation for the use of Σ2 in the main question lies in the characterization of the
Σ2 properties in set theory as those that are locally verifiable, in the sense that
their truth can be verified by checking certain facts in only a bounded part of the
set-theoretic universe, such as inside some rank-initial segment Vθ or inside the
collection Hκ of all sets of hereditary size less than κ. So let us review the basic
facts.
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Lemma 2 (Folklore). For any assertion ϕ in the language of set theory, the fol-
lowing are equivalent:
(1) ϕ is ZFC-provably equivalent to a Σ2 assertion.
(2) ϕ is ZFC-provably equivalent to an assertion of the form “ ∃θ Vθ |= ψ,”
where ψ can be a statement of any complexity.
(3) ϕ is ZFC-provably equivalent to an assertion of the form “ ∃κHκ |= ψ,”
where ψ can be a statement of any complexity.
Proof. (3 → 2) Since Hκ is correctly computed inside Vθ for any θ > κ, it follows
that to assert that some Hκ satisfies ψ is the same as to assert that some Vθ thinks
that there is some cardinal κ such that Hκ satisfies ψ.
(2 → 1) The statement ∃θ Vθ |= ψ is equivalent to the assertion that there is
an ordinal θ and a sequence v = 〈vα | α ≤ θ〉 of sets fulfilling the definition of the
cumulative Vα hierarchy, namely, v0 = ∅, every vα+1 is the power set of vα and
vλ =
⋃
α<λ vα at limit ordinals λ, and finally such that vθ |= ψ. This assertion has
complexity Σ2, since it begins with ∃θ∃v and uses a universal quantifier to assert
sα+1 = P (sα); the final clause vθ |= ψ has complexity ∆0, since all quantifiers of ψ
become bounded by vθ.
(1 → 3) We make use of the Le´vy absoluteness theorem, which asserts for any
uncountable cardinal κ that Hκ ≺Σ1 V , a fact that can be proved by the Mostowski
collapse of a witness in V to find a suitable witness inside Hκ. For the theorem,
consider any Σ2 assertion ∃x∀y ϕ0(x, y), where ϕ0 has only bounded quantifiers.
This assertion is equivalent to ∃κHκ |= ∃x∀y ϕ0(x, y), where κ is an uncountable
cardinal, simply because if there is such a κ with Hκ having such an x, then by
Le´vy absoluteness, this x works for all y ∈ V since Hκ ≺Σ1 V ; and conversely, if
there is an x such that ∀y ϕ0(x, y), then this will remain true inside any Hκ with
x ∈ Hκ. 
Once a Σ2 fact is witnessed in a model of set theory M , therefore, it follows that
it remains true in all top-extensions of M . Thus, a Σ2 definable set is enumerated
as the cumulative Vθ hierarchy grows.
2.3. Coding into the GCH pattern. Easton’s theorem allows us to control pre-
cisely the pattern of success and failure of the generalized continuum hypothesis
GCH at the regular cardinals. For example, for any a ⊆ ω, we can find a forcing
extension V [G] where n ∈ a if and only if the GCH holds at ℵn. More generally, for
any set of ordinals A ⊆ γ, let us say that A is coded into the GCH pattern starting
at δ, if 2δ = δ+(γ) and then A is coded into the GCH pattern on the next γ many
successor cardinals, so that α ∈ A if and only if the GCH holds at δ+(γ+α+1), for
all α < γ. And again, Easton’s theorem shows how to code any desired set A into
the GCH pattern of a forcing extension, starting at any desired regular cardinal δ
and without adding bounded sets to δ. Since every set is coded by a set of ordinals,
this method provides a way to encode any desired set into the GCH pattern of a
forcing extension.
2.4. Go¨del-Carnap fixed point lemma. Nearly all logicians are familiar with
the Go¨del fixed-point lemma, which asserts that for any formula ϕ(x) in the lan-
guage of arithmetic, there is a sentence ψ for which PA ⊢ ψ ↔ ϕ(pψq). One
may easily adapt the lemma to the language of set theory, using a weak frag-
ment of set theory in place of PA. The usual proof also works when ϕ(x, ~y) has
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additional free variables, in which case the fixed point is a formula ψ(~y) with
∀~y[ψ(~y) ↔ ϕ(pψq, ~y)], and this formulation is known as the Go¨del-Carnap fixed-
point lemma. One can use this latter form, as we shall in the proof of the main
theorem, to define a function n 7→ (β, k, y) by specifying its graph ψ(n, β, k, y),
which holds when ϕ(pψq, n, β, k, y). That is, one defines the function by a property
that makes reference to the defining formula itself. The Go¨del-Carnap fixed-point
lemma ensures that indeed there is such a formula ψ.
3. Special cases of the main theorem
We shall approach the main theorem by first proving some special cases of it,
specifically by providing separate definitions of the universal finite set for the cases
of countable ω-nonstandard models and countable ω-standard models. Later, in
section 4, we shall explain how to merge these two definitions into a single universal
definition that will establish the main theorem by working with all countable models
simultaneously.
3.1. Process A. Consider the following process, proceeding in finite stages, which
will establish the main theorem for the case of ω-nonstandard models of set theory.
At stage n, if the earlier stages were successful, we search for an ordinal βn, a
natural number kn and a finite set yn fulfilling a certain locally verifiable property,
and if we find them, we shall say that stage n is successful and declare ϕA(a) to
hold of every a ∈ yn. The ordinals βn will be increasing
β0 < β1 < · · · < βn,
while the natural numbers, crucially, will be decreasing
k0 > k1 > · · · > kn.
It follows that there can be only finitely many successful stages, and consequently
the set { a | ϕA(a) } ultimately defined by ϕA will be finite. The process itself
amounts to the map n 7→ (βn, kn, yn), and our definition of this map will make
explicit reference to the outcome of the map defined in the same way in various
other models of set theory. This may seem initially to be a circular definition,
but the Go¨del-Carnap fixed-point lemma, explained in section 2, shows that indeed
there is a definition solving this recursion; the situation is analogous to typical
uses of the Kleene recursion theorem in the constructions of computability theory.
Fix a computable enumeration of the theory ZFC, and let ZFCk denote the theory
resulting from the first k axioms in this enumeration.
To begin, stage 0 is successful if there is a pair 〈β0, k0〉, minimal respect to the
lexical order, such that β0 is a i-fixed point and the structure 〈Vβ0 ,∈〉 has no
topped-extension to a model
〈
N,∈N
〉
of ZFCk0 satisfying the assertion, “stage 0
succeeds with β0 and is the last successful stage, and this remains true after any
P (β0)-preserving forcing.” In this case, let y0 be the finite set coded into the GCH
pattern starting at β+0 , if indeed there is a finite set coded there (take y0 = ∅
otherwise), and we declare ϕA(a) to be true for all a ∈ y0.
More generally, stage n is successful, if all the previous stages were successful
and we find a i-fixed point βn above all previous βi and a natural number kn less
than all previous ki for i < n, taking 〈βn, kn〉 to be minimal in the lexical order,
such that the structure 〈Vβn ,∈〉 has no topped-extension to a model
〈
N,∈N
〉
of
ZFCkn satisfying the assertion, “stage n succeeds with βn and is the last successful
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stage, and this remains true after any P (βn)-preserving forcing.” In this case, let
yn be the finite set coded into the GCH pattern starting at β
+
n , using yn = ∅ if
there is no finite set coded there, and declare ϕA(a) to hold for all a ∈ yn.
Let us verify several facts about this construction. First, at each stage the
question of whether or not there is such a model
〈
N,∈N
〉
as described in the
process is verifiable in Vβn+1 and the encoded set yn is revealed in any sufficiently
large Vθ. So the map n 7→ (βn, kn, yn) has complexity ∆2 and ϕA therefore has
complexity Σ2. Because the kn’s are descending in the natural numbers, there can
be only finitely many successful stages, and so { a | ϕA(a) } is finite.
We claim that if M is a model of ZFC in which stage n is successful, then the
number kn must be nonstandard and in particular, M must be an ω-nonstandard
model. Since the k-sequence is descending, we might as well consider only the last
successful stage inM . Note that if stage n is successful, then this remains true after
any P (βn)-preserving forcing, with the same βn and kn, since such forcing cannot
create fundamentally new models N of size βn, and so by moving to the relevant
successive forcing extensions and increasing n if necessary, we may also assume
without loss that n is the last successful stage in M and remains the last successful
stage in any P (βn)-preserving forcing extension of M . For stage n to have been
successful, it means by definition that M thinks there is no topped-extension of
〈Vβn ,∈〉 to a model
〈
N,∈N
〉
satisfying ZFCkn in which stage n succeeds with βn,
is the last successful stage, and this remains true after all P (βn)-preserving forcing.
But since n actually did succeed with βn, was the last successful stage inM and this
was preserved by this kind of forcing, however, it follows by the reflection theorem
that for any standard k there are many ordinals θ > βn for which Vθ satisfies ZFCk
and agrees that n was the last successful stage, that it succeeded with βn and that
this is preserved by all P (βn)-preserving forcing. Since Vθ is a topped-extension of
Vβn , this means k < kn for all such k and so kn must be nonstandard. In particular,
process A has no successful stages at all in an ω-standard model of ZFC.
Let us now verify the universal top-extension property. Suppose that M is a
countable ω-nonstandard model of ZFC in which ϕA happens to define the set y
and that z is a (possibly nonstandard) finite set inM with y ⊆ z. Let n be the first
unsuccessful stage in M , and let M+ be any countable elementary top-extension
of M (not necessarily topped); such a model exists by the arguments of section 2.
Let β be any i-fixed point of M+ above M and let k be any nonstandard natural
number of M+ below all ki for i < n. Since stage n was the first unsuccessful
stage in M , it follows by elementarity that this is also true in M+. In particular,
stage n did not succeed with β and k, even though β > βi and k < ki for i < n.
In order for this stage to have been unsuccessful—and this is the key step of the
argument, explaining why the definition is the way that it is—it must have been
that there is a topped-extension of 〈VM
+
β ,∈〉 to a model
〈
N,∈N
〉
satisfying ZFCk
and the assertion, “stage n is successful with β and is the last successful stage, and
this remains true after any P (β)-preserving forcing,” for otherwise the lack of such
a model N would have caused stage n to be successful in M+. So β = βNn . Since
k is nonstandard, the model
〈
N,∈N
〉
is a model of the actual ZFC, and since it
top-extends VM
+
β , it also top-extends the original model M . So we have found a
top-extension ofM in which stage n is the last successful stage and this is preserved
by P (β)-preserving forcing. Let N [G] be a forcing extension of N in which the set
z is coded into the GCH pattern starting at β+. (Since N is countable, we may
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easily find an N -generic filter G, and the Boolean ultrapower construction leads to
the forcing extension N [G] with ground model N , even when N is nonstandard;
see [HS06] for further explanation of forcing over ill-founded models.) Since this
forcing preserves P (β), it follows that N [G] thinks stage n is the last successful
stage. And since we’ve now coded z into the GCH pattern starting at β+, and
y ⊆ z, it follows that N [G] thinks { a | ϕA(a) } is precisely z. So we have achieved
the universal top-extension property, as desired, for the case of ω-nonstandard
models.
3.2. Process B. Let us now describe an alternative process, which will work with
the ω-standard models (we have already pointed out that process A has no success-
ful stages in such models).
Stage 0 of process B is successful, if there is a i-fixed point γ0 such that after
forcing to collapse γ0 to ω, the now-countable structure 〈Vγ0 ,∈〉 has no topped-
extension to a model
〈
N,∈N
〉
satisfying ZFC (not a fragment) and the assertion,
“stage 0 is successful with γ0 and is the last successful stage, and this remains true
after any P (γ0)-preserving forcing.” This is a true Π
1
1 assertion in the collapse
extension V [g0], which is therefore equivalent to the well-foundedness of the canon-
ically associated tree, which has some rank λ0 in V [g0]; by homogeneity this does
not depend on the generic filter. In this case, taking the pair 〈γ0, λ0〉 to be lexically
least, we let y0 be the finite set coded into the GCH pattern starting at γ
+
0 , or ∅ if
there is not a finite set coded there, and declare that ϕB(a) holds for all a ∈ y0.
More generally, stage n of process B is successful, if there is a i-fixed point γn
larger than all previous γi and an ordinal λn strictly smaller than all previous λi for
i < n, such that in the collapse extension of γn to ω, the now-countable structure
〈Vγn ,∈〉 has no topped-extension to a model
〈
N,∈N
〉
satisfying (full) ZFC and
the assertion, “stage n succeeds with γn and is the last successful stage, and this
remains true after any P (γn)-preserving forcing,” such that furthermore the rank
of the canonical well-founded tree witnessing this as a true Π11 assertion is precisely
λn. In this case, taking 〈γn, λn〉 to be lexically least, we interpret the GCH pattern
starting at γ+n to code a finite set yn, and we declare ϕB(a) to hold for all a ∈ yn.
This completes the description of process B. Let us prove that it has the desired
properties. The map n 7→ (γn, λn, yn) has a graph with complexity ∆2, since any
sufficiently large Vθ can verify whether or not (γ, λ, y) are as desired, and so the
definition ϕB(a) has complexity Σ2. Since the λn-sequence is strictly descending,
there will be only finitely many successful stages and therefore { a | ϕB(a) } will be
finite.
If stage n is successful in an ω-standard modelM , then we claim that the associ-
ated ordinal λn must come from the ill-founded part of the model, and in particular,
M must not be well-founded. To see this, it suffices to consider the case that n is
the last successful stage in M and furthermore, by moving to finitely many succes-
sive forcing extensions, if necessary, that this is preserved by any P (γn)-preserving
forcing. Thus, M itself is a topped-extension of VMγn satisfying ZFC and the asser-
tion, “stage n succeeds with γn and is the last successful stage, and this remains
true after any P (γn)-preserving forcing.” So the tree whose well-foundedness is
equivalent to the non-existence of such a model cannot be actually well-founded,
and so the rank λn of that tree must be in the ill-founded part ofM . In particular,
in any transitive model of ZFC, there are no successful stages at all in process B.
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Let us now verify the universal top-extension property for countable ω-standard
models. Suppose that M is a countable ω-standard model of ZFC in which ϕB
happens to define the set y and that z is a finite set in M with y ⊆ z. Let n
be the first unsuccessful stage in M , and let M+ be any countable elementary
top-extension of M , not necessarily topped. Let γ be any i-fixed point of M+
above M . We claim that there is a topped-extension of the structure 〈VM
+
γ ,∈〉 to
a countable model
〈
N,∈N
〉
of ZFC satisfying the assertion, “stage n succeeds with
γ and is the last successful stage, and this remains true after any P (γ)-preserving
forcing.” Suppose toward contradiction that this is not true. Then in particular, in
the forcing extensionM+[g] collapsing γ to ω, there is no such model. Let T be the
tree whose well-foundedness is canonically equivalent to the nonexistence of such a
model, and let λ be the rank of this tree. Since M is an ω-model, this is the same
tree as considered in M+[g] during process B. Since T is actually well-founded in
V , as the statement that there is no such model N was true in V by assumption,
it follows that T is also well-founded in M+[g], and furthermore, the ranks must
agree. So λ is an ordinal in the well-founded part of M , and consequently λ < λi
for all i < n, since we have previously noted that those ordinals, if defined, reside in
the ill-founded part of M . But this situation shows that stage n must be successful
in M+, contrary to the choice of n as the first unsuccessful stage there. So our
initial assumption must have been false, and therefore indeed, there must be such
a countable model N that is a topped-extension of VM
+
γ in which stage n succeeds
at γ and is the last successful stage, and this remains true in all P (γ)-preserving
forcing extensions. Let N [G] be a forcing extension of N that codes the set z into
the GCH pattern starting at γ+n . Since the earlier stages succeed at stages in M ,
far below γ, the only new sets fulfilling ϕB in N [G] will come from stage n, and this
will include exactly the elements of z. So in N [G], the set { a | ϕB(a) } is precisely
the set z, as desired for the universal top-extension property.
4. Proof of the main theorem
We shall now merge the two processes of section 3 into a single process that
provides a Σ2 definition with the universal top-extension property stated in the
main theorem.
Proof of the main theorem. We describe process C, which simply runs processes A
and B concurrently, except that the results of process B are accepted only if no
stage of A has yet been successful, that is, as the rank hierarchy Vθ grows. In
other words, once process A is successful, then process C proceeds further only
with process A. Let ϕ(a) hold if a is accepted by process C.
It follows that any instance of ϕ(a) is verified in some Vθ and so ϕ has complexity
Σ2. Since processes A and B accept only finitely many objects, it follows that
{ a | ϕ(a) } will also be a finite set. We have mentioned that neither process A nor
B accepts any sets in a transitive model of ZFC, and so the set { a | ϕ(a) } is empty
in any such model.
Finally, we verify the top-extension property. Suppose that M is a countable
model of ZFC in which process ϕ happens to define the finite set y, and that z
is a finite set in M with y ⊆ z. If M is ω-standard, then process A will have no
successful stages, and so process C will amount in this case to process B, which we
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have already proved has the top-extension property. So there is a top-extension in
which ϕ defines exactly the set z.
If M is ω-nonstandard and process A has had at least one successful stage in
M , then process C will continue only with process A, which has the top-extension
property for ω-nonstandard models. So we can find a top-extension N in which
process A and hence also C accepts exactly the elements of z, as desired.
The remaining case occurs when M is ω-nonstandard, but process A has not
yet had a successful stage 0. Perhaps process B has been successful or perhaps
not. Let M+ be an elementary top-extension of M , not necessarily topped, and
let β be any i-fixed point of M+ above all the ordinals of M and let k be any
nonstandard natural number ofM . By elementarity, ϕ defines the set y inM+ and
process A has not had a successful stage 0 in M+. In particular, this stage did not
succeed with 〈β, k〉, and therefore there must be a topped-extension of 〈VM
+
β ,∈〉
to a model
〈
N,∈N
〉
in M+ that satisfies ZFCk and thinks stage 0 is successful in
process A with β and is the last successful stage, and this is preserved by further
P (β)-preserving forcing. Let N [G] be a forcing extension of N in which z is coded
into the GCH pattern starting at β+. This forcing is P (β)-preserving, and so stage
0 of process A is successful at β in N [G] and is the last successful stage. Note that
process B has had no additional successful stages below β in N [G], except those
that were already successful in M , since N [G] agrees with M+ up to Vβ . Thus,
process C does nothing new in N [G] except the now successful stage 0 of process A
using β, and since z is the set coded into the GCH pattern at β+, it follows that ϕ
will define precisely the set z in N [G], thereby providing the desired top-extension
of M . 
Our use of GCH coding in the proof of the main theorem can be replaced with
essentially any of the other standard coding methods, such as ✸∗κ coding [BT09].
All that is needed about the coding is that one can force to code any given set
starting at any given cardinal, while not adding bounded sets to that cardinal. By
using the alternative coding methods, one could for example arrange to have GCH
in the extension models, provided the original model had GCH.
5. Maximal Σ2 theories
The existence of the universal finite set provided by the main theorem has a
bearing on the question of maximal Σ2 theories in models of set theory. A model of
set theory M |= ZFC has a maximal Σ2 theory, if the Σ2 fragment of the theory of
M is a maximal consistent Σ2 extension of ZFC. In other words, any Σ2 assertion
σ that is consistent with ZFC plus the Σ2 theory of M is already true in M .
Observation 3. If there is a model of ZFC, then there is a model of ZFC with a
maximal Σ2 theory.
Proof. Suppose that ZFC is consistent. Enumerate the Σ2 sentences σ0, σ1, σ2,
and so on. Let us form a certain theory T . We start with ZFC, which we have
already assumed is consistent. At stage n, we add the sentence σn, if the resulting
theory remains consistent. Let T be the theory after all stages are completed.
(This theory is just like the usual construction to complete a theory, except that we
consider only Σ2 sentences and we have a preference for adding the Σ2 sentences,
rather than their negations.) The theory T is consistent, by compactness, since it
is consistent at each stage. If M is a model of T , then M is a model of ZFC with
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a maximal Σ2 theory, since if σ is a Σ2 sentence consistent with the Σ2 theory of
M , then σ is σn for some n, and we would have added σ to the theory T at stage
n. 
Theorem 4. For every model of set theory M |= ZFC, there is a Σ2 assertion
σ(n) with some natural-number parameter n ∈ ωM , which is not true in M but is
consistent with the Σ2 diagram of M .
Proof. Let σ(n) be the assertion that the universal set { a | ϕ(a) } defined in the
main theorem has at least n elements. This is a Σ2 assertion, but for some n it is
not yet true, although it is consistent with the Σ2 diagram of M , since it is true in
a top extension of any countable elementary substructure of M . 
Corollary 5. No ω-standard model of ZFC has a maximal Σ2 theory. In particular,
no transitive model of ZFC has a maximal Σ2 theory.
Proof. If M is ω-standard, then the parameter n in the previous theorem is defin-
able, and so σ(n) can be taken as a Σ2 sentence, not yet true in M but consistent
with the Σ2 theory of M . So the Σ2-theory of M was not maximal. 
One may weaken the hypothesis of the corollary fromM being ω-standard to as-
sume only that every natural number ofM is Σ2-definable inM . No such countable
model can realize a maximal Σ2 theory, since we can always move to a top-extension
with a new Σ2 assertion becoming true. In the previous arguments, we could have
used the assertions, “stage n is successful,” rather than the assertions about the
size of the universal finite set.
Theorem 6. In any countable model of set theory M , every element of M becomes
Σ2 definable from a natural number parameter in some top-extension of M . Indeed,
there is a single definition and single parameter n ∈ ωM , such that every a ∈M is
defined by that definition with that parameter in some top-extension M+.
Proof. Let n be the first unsuccessful stage of the universal finite set. For any
object a ∈M , it follows by the main theorem that there is a top extension M+ of
M such that stage n is now successful in M+ and a is the only set added at stage
n. So a has become Σ2-definable in M
+ from parameter n, and the definition does
not depend on a. 
Corollary 7. For any countable ω-standard model of set theory M , every object a
of M becomes Σ2 definable without parameters in some top-extension M
+ of M .
Since M+ is also ω-standard, the result can be iterated.
Proof. This follows immediately from the preceding theorem, since the number n
used in that proof is standard finite and hence definable in a way that is absolute
to further top-extensions. 
By iterating the previous corollary, we can form a top-extensional tower of models
of ZFC,
M0 ⊆M1 ⊆M2 ⊆ · · ·
such that every object in any Mn is Σ2 definable without parameters in some later
Mk. The union will not in general be a nice model, for the universal finite set
{ x | ϕ(x) } as defined in the union will be internally infinite, with no last successful
stage.
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6. Top-extensional set-theoretic potentialism
Let us now introduce and consider the theory of top-extensional set-theoretic
potentialism, concerned with the collection of countable models of ZFC set theory,
each accessing precisely its top-extensions. This is a potentialist system in the sense
of [HL18], where Hamkins and Linnebo considered several kinds of set-theoretic
potentialism, determining in each case the corresponding potentialist validities and
investigating the potentialist maximality principles. That investigation had built
on earlier work in the modal logic of forcing, another potentialist concept in set
theory; Hamkins introduced the forcing modality in [Ham03]; Hamkins and Lo¨we
determined the modal logic of forcing in [HL08], with further analysis in [HL13]
and [HLL15].
Here, we extend the analysis to the case of top-extensional set-theoretic potential-
ism, a case not treated in [HL18]. Our analysis amounts to a set-theoretic analogue
of [Ham18], where Hamkins considered the models of PA under top-extensions,
analyzing the theory of top-extensional arithmetic potentialism.
M
N0
N1
N11
N10
Figure 1. A model of set theory M with several top-extensions;
they form a tree
As a Kripke model, the set-theoretic top-extensional system provides natural
interpretations of the modal operators. Namely, ϕ is true at a countable model
of set theory M if there is a top-extension of M to a model N in which ϕ is true,
and ϕ is true at M if all top-extensions N of M satisfy ϕ. One aims to study the
modal validities of this system.
Specifically, an assertion ϕ(p0, . . . , pn) of propositional modal logic, expressed
with propositional variables, Boolean connectives and modal operators, is valid
at a world with respect to a language of assertions, if ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψj) is true at
that world for any assertions ψi in that substitution language. In general, the
question of whether a given modal assertion ϕ is valid depends on the language
of allowed substitution instances, such as whether parameters from M are allowed
or not. Following [HL18], let us denote by Val(M,L∈(A)) the set of propositional
modal assertions ϕ(p0, . . . , pj) that are valid in M with respect to assertions in the
language of set theory allowing parameters from A. Allowing a larger substitution
language or larger set of parameters is, of course, a more stringent requirement
for validity, because of the additional substitution instances. So Val(M,L∈(A)) is
inversely monotone in A.
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Theorem 8. Consider the potentialist system consisting of the countable models
of ZFC, each accessing its top extensions. For any model of set theory M , the
modal assertions that are valid in M for assertions in the language of set theory
allowing parameters from M or even just natural number parameters (and a single
particular natural number n ∈ NM suffices), are exactly the assertions of the modal
theory S4. Meanwhile, the validities with respect to sentences are contained within
S5. Succinctly,
S4 = Val (M,L∈(M)) = Val
(
M,L∈(N
M )
)
= Val (M,L∈({n})) ⊆ Val (M,L∈) ⊆ S5.
The inclusions stated at the end are optimal. Specifically, the particular pa-
rameter n that suffices is the first unsuccessful stage of the universal finite set in
M . When this is a standard number, then it is absolutely definable and hence not
needed as a parameter, and in such a case the sentential validities are Val(M,L∈) =
S4, realizing the lower bound. Meanwhile, theorem 11 shows that some models have
sentential validities Val(M,L∈) = S5, realizing the upper bound.
Proof. It is easy to see that every assertion of S4 is valid, regardless of the language
for the substitution instances, for indeed, S4 is valid in any potentialist system.
The content of the theorem is that, in contrast to many of the potentialist systems
analyzed in [HL18], there are no additional validities beyond S4 for this potentialist
system, using the language of set theory with parameters.
For this, we follow the main technique of [Ham18], where it was proved that
the potentialist validities of the models of arithmetic under top-extension are also
exactly S4. Suppose that ϕ(p0, . . . , pj) is a propositional modal assertion not in S4.
Let M be any countable model of ZFC, and let n be the first unsuccessful stage in
the definition of the universal finite set inM . We will provide a substitution instance
ϕ(ψ0(n), . . . , ψj(n)) of the formula ϕ that is false at M in the top-extensional
potentialist semantics, using parameter n.
Since the collection of finite pre-trees is a complete set of frames for S4, there
is a Kripke model K of propositional worlds, whose underlying frame is a finite
pre-tree T , where ϕ(p0, . . . , pj) fails at an initial world. Let k be such that this tree
Figure 2. A pre-tree of possible worlds
is at most k-branching, and let m be such that all the clusters have size at most m.
Consider the universal finite set as defined in M and its top-extensions. This set
is the result of a finite sequence of successful stages, each stage adding finitely many
additional sets to the universal finite set. Thus, the process produces a definable
finite sequence of natural numbers. From that list, but starting only from stage
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n, we may extract the subsequence consisting of the numbers less than k, which
we may interpret as describing a particular way of successively climbing up the
clusters of T , directing us to choose a particular branching cluster at each step,
plus the last number on the list (from stage n onward) that is k or larger (or 0 if
there is none), which we may interpret as picking a particular node in that cluster
by considering it modulo m. In this way, we associate with each node t of the pre-
tree T a statement Φt that describes something about the nature of the sequence
enumerated by the universal finite set process, in such a way that any world N
satisfying Φt will satisfy Φr just in case t ≤ r in T . The reason is that the main
theorem shows that the universal sequence as just defined can be extended in any
desired finite way in a top extension. Thus, we have provided what is called a
labeling for the finite pre-tree in [HLL15]; this is a railyard labeling in the sense
of [Ham18]. It follows from [HLL15, lemma 9] (see also [Ham18, theorem 28]) that
there are sentences ψ0(n), ψ1(n),. . . ,ψj(n), that track the truth of the propositional
variables in the worlds of the propositional Kripke model K, using the parameter
n, so that N |= ϕ(ψ0(n), . . . , ψj(n)) just in case (K, t) |= ϕ(p0, . . . , pj), where t is
the unique world of K with N |= Φt. We may assume that having nothing at stage
n or beyond corresponds to the initial world of K, where ϕ(p0, . . . , pj) fails. And
since the model of set theory M has nothing at stage n or beyond, it follows that
M |= ¬ϕ(ψ0(n), . . . , ψj(n)), and we have therefore found the desired substitution
instance showing that ϕ is not valid in M for assertions with parameter n.
Lastly, when parameters are not allowed, it remains to show that the sentential
validities are contained in S5. For this, it suffices by the main results of [HLL15]
to show that the model supports arbitrarily large families of independent switches,
or alternatively a dial (a dial in a Kripke model is a sequence of statements, such
that every world satisfies exactly one of them and the possibility of all the others).
For any standard finite number k, let dk be the sentence asserting that the last
successful stage of process C in the main theorem admits a set of size k to the
universal finite set. These sentences can be used to form a dial of any desired finite
size, since we can always top-extend so as to make any one of them true. So the
modal validities of any model of set theoryM in the system will be contained within
S5. 
Corollary 9. If there is a transitive model of ZFC, or indeed merely a model of
ZFC in which the universal finite set is empty or has standard finite size, then the
modal assertions that are valid in every countable model of set theory, with respect
to sentences of the language of set theory, are exactly the assertions of S4.
Proof. Suppose thatM is a model of ZFC set theory in which the universal finite set
has standard finite size. So the first unsuccessful stage n in M is a standard finite
number. Thus, we do not need it as a parameter in theorem 8, since it is definable
in a way that is absolute to top-extensions. So the top-extensional validities of M ,
with respect to sentences in the language of set theory, are exactly S4. 
Meanwhile, there are other models, whose sentential validities strictly exceed
S4, showing that the validities can depend on whether one allows parameters or
not. In order to prove this, let us first establish the following characterization of
top-extensional possibility. This lemma is the set-theoretic analogue of the corre-
sponding analysis of [Ham18] for models of arithmetic.
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Lemma 10 (Possibility-characterization lemma). In the top-extensional potential-
ist system consisting of the countable models of ZFC under top-extensions, the
following are equivalent for any countable ω-nonstandard model of set theory M
and any assertion ϕ(a) in the language of set theory with parameter a ∈M .
(1) M |= ϕ(a). That is, ϕ(a) is true in some top-extension of M .
(2) For every standard number k and every ordinal β in M , in the collapse
extension M [G] where VMβ is made countable, there is a top-extension of
〈V Mβ ,∈〉 to a model
〈
N,∈N
〉
satisfying ZFCk and ϕ(a).
(3) There is some nonstandard k, such that for every ordinal β in M there is in
the collapse extension M [G] a top-extension of 〈VMβ ,∈〉 to a model 〈N,∈〉
satisfying ZFCk and ϕ(a).
Proof. (2→ 3) Overspill.
(3→ 1) Fix the nonstandard number k as in statement 3. LetM+ be a countable
elementary top-extension of M , and let β be some new ordinal of M+ larger than
the ordinals of M . In the collapse extension M+[G] in which V Nβ is countable,
there is a top-extension of 〈VM
+
β ,∈〉 to a model
〈
N,∈N
〉
in which ZFCk and ϕ(a)
hold. By the choice of β above M , and since k is nonstandard, it follows that N is
a top-extension of M to a model of ZFC in which ϕ(a), so M |= ϕ(a), as desired.
(1 → 2) Suppose that M has a top-extension to a model N of ZFC in which
ϕ(a) holds. For any standard finite k, by the reflection theorem in N , there are
arbitrarily large ordinals δ for which V Nδ |= ZFCk ∧ ϕ(a). So for every ordinal β
in M , there is in N a top-extension of 〈VMβ ,∈〉 to a model of ZFCk plus ϕ(a). Let
G be N -generic for the collapse forcing to make VMβ countable. So in N [G] the
Σ11 statement asserting that there is such a model extending 〈V
M
β ,∈〉 is true. By
Shoenfield absoluteness, this statement is also true in M [G], as this model has the
same countable ordinals. So statement 2 holds. 
It follows that ϕ(a) is true in a countable ω-nonstandard model of set theory
M just in case there is some ordinal β and some standard number k such that M
thinks that in the collapse forcing extension M [G] making VMβ countable, there is
no top-extension of 〈VMβ ,∈〉 to a model 〈N,∈〉 of ZFCk in which ¬ϕ(a) is true. In
particular, every instance of necessity, for an assertion of any complexity, is true
because a certain Σ2 fact is true in M , namely, the existence of a β for which the
collapse forcing forces a certain fact about a certain standard natural number k.
Following the ideas of [HL18], let us say that a countable model of set theory
M satisfies the top-extensional maximality principle, if for any sentence ϕ in the
language of set theory, if there is a top extension N of M in which ϕ is true and
remains true in all further top-extensions of N , then ϕ was already true in M . In
modal terms, the top-extensional maximality principle is expressed by the scheme of
assertions ϕ→ ϕ, where the modal operators refer to top-extensional possibility
and top-extensional necessity, respectively.
Theorem 11. If there is a model of ZFC, then there is a model of ZFC satisfy-
ing the top-extensional maximality principle. Indeed, any countable model of ZFC
satisfying a maximal Σ2 theory will satisfy the top-extensional maximality principle.
Proof. If there is any model of ZFC, then observation 3 shows that there is a model
of set theory M with a maximal Σ2 theory. Fix any such model M . It must be ω-
nonstandard, since otherwise there are new Σ2 sentences that could become true in
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a top extension, concerning the size or number of successful stages in the universal
finite set. To verify the maximality principle in M , suppose that M |= σ,
meaning that there is some top-extension of M to a model M+ in which σ holds
and continues to hold in all further top-extensions of M+. Since M+ |= σ, this
means that ¬σ is not possible over M+, and so by lemma 10 there is some ordinal
β and standard number k such that in the collapse extension of M+ making VM
+
β
countable, there is no top-extension of 〈V M
+
β ,∈
M+〉 to a model 〈N,∈N 〉 satisfying
ZFCk plus ¬σ. The existence of such an ordinal β is a Σ2 assertion that is true in
M+ and therefore consistent with the Σ2 theory of M . By the maximality of the
Σ2 theory of M , it follows that there is such an ordinal β already in M . Therefore,
by lemma 10 again it follows that M |= σ and in particular, σ is true in M . So
M satisfies the top-extensional maximality principle. 
The proof really shows that if a countable model of set theory M satisfies the
maximality principle for Σ2 sentences, then it satisfies the maximality for all sen-
tences in the language of set theory. The main theorem shows that no countable
model of set theory M satisfies the top-extensional maximality principle with re-
spect to assertions allowing parameters from M , even merely natural number pa-
rameters.
Corollary 12. If ZFC is consistent, then there are models of ZFC whose top-
extensional potentialist validities, with respect to sentences in the language of set
theory, are exactly S5.
Val(M,L∈) = S5.
Proof. The maximality principle amounts to S5 as a lower bound, and we already
have S5 as an upper bound by theorem 8. 
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